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It has been argued that humans can face an ethical/epistemic dilemma over the automatic
stereotyping involved in implicit bias: ethical demands require that we consistently treat
people equally, as equally likely to possess certain traits, but if our aim is knowledge or
understanding our responses should reﬂect social inequalities meaning that members of
certain social groups are statistically more likely than others to possess particular
features. I use psychological research to argue that often the best choice from the
epistemic perspective is the same as the best choice from the ethical perspective: to
avoid automatic stereotyping even when this involves failing to reﬂect social realities
in our judgements. This argument has an important implication: it shows that it is not
possible to successfully defend an act of automatic stereotyping simply on the basis
that the stereotype reﬂects an aspect of social reality. An act of automatic
stereotyping can be poor from an epistemic perspective even if the stereotype that is
activated reﬂects reality.
Keywords: Implicit bias; stereotypes; stereotyping; epistemic innocence; epistemic
costs and beneﬁts; distorted judgement
1. Introduction
Imagine the following scenarios. Pete and Anita have both developed into adulthood in
societies in which women but not men are provided with parental leave after the birth of
a child. In these societies, because of the parental leave provision, women and not men
tend to stay at home to look after the children just after birth. Out of necessity and often
through trial and error, women tend to develop characteristics appropriately described as
nurturing while male partners do not develop these characteristics because they do not
occupy the position of primary caregiver.1 However, there is nothing in the nature of
women that means that they are nurturing and many men are nurturing. Pete is exposed
to a media portrayal of family life in which men are predominantly cast in a provider
role while women are cast as nurturing. Women are therefore portrayed as if they will be
better at childrearing than their male counterparts. Anita, in contrast, has been brought
up in a society in which men and women are portrayed in the media as equally nurturing,
and equally good at childrearing. While Pete becomes disposed to automatically respond to
women as if they are more nurturing than men, Anita becomes disposed to automatically
respond as if men and women are equally nurturing.
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Now consider another example. Farah and Timothy have been brought up in a society in
which women are severely underrepresented at senior levels in the sciences. In the societies
in which they live there are deeply entrenched and systematic inequalities in science
meaning that many women hit a glass ceiling before they reach senior levels. Both Farah
and Timothy have consequently both become predisposed to automatically respond as if
all senior scientists are male. When told that they will meet a senior scientist, they both
automatically respond as if the scientist will be male; when told about the latest advanced
feat of engineering they automatically picture a male engineer leading the team behind it,
and so on. Both Farah and Timothy are on hiring panels, selecting candidates to interview
for a junior role as a scientiﬁc researcher. The aim in both cases is to identify a future leader
in their scientiﬁc ﬁeld. Farah ensures that the application material she considers is anon-
ymous, with the gender removed, so that she does not respond differently to the applications
of men and women. She does not automatically associate the male candidates more strongly
than the female candidates with advanced scientiﬁc expertise and leadership because she is
unaware of the candidates’ gender. In contrast, when Timothy views the application
material he has access to information about the gender of the candidates. He consequently
automatically associates the male candidates more strongly than the female candidates with
advanced scientiﬁc expertise and leadership, reﬂecting the social reality that scientiﬁc
experts are more likely to be male than female.
Now imagine that you can determine whether someone you care about is brought up in a
situation like that of Pete or Anita, or makes a recruitment decision using anonymous or non-
anonymous application material. You are choosing for that individual to either be disposed to
automatically respond in a way that reﬂects the social realities, or to automatically respond in
what shall be described in this paper as the egalitarian way. The automatic responses that
reﬂect the social realities include responding as if any nurturing person is more likely to
be a woman than a man and responding as if any future leader in science is more likely
to be male than female. Meanwhile, the egalitarian responses include responding as if any
nurturing person who is good at childrearing is equally likely to be a man or a woman;
and responding to candidates of each gender as if they are equally likely to be future scien-
tiﬁc leaders. It seems as if you face an ethical/epistemic dilemma (Kelly and Roedder 2008;
Haslanger 2010; Egan 2011; Gendler 2011; Mugg 2013; for discussion see Brownstein
2015): you can choose either (i) the ethical choice, which is for the individual to respond
in the egalitarian way; or (ii) the epistemically beneﬁcial choice, that is, the choice that
will increase the chance of the individual forming true beliefs and making accurate judge-
ments. On this view, the ethical choice would make the individual less likely to achieve epis-
temic goals like obtaining true beliefs or ﬁtting their beliefs to the evidence. It might seem, in
other words, that to achieve goals such as obtaining true beliefs or ﬁtting beliefs with the
evidence, one should reﬂect the social realities of inequalities in one’s automatic responses.
In this paper I challenge this intuitive position, arguing that failing to reﬂect realities of
inequalities in our automatic responses can be the best thing from an epistemic perspective.
To articulate this idea, I utilise the notion of epistemic innocence that has been introduced
by Bortolotti (2015a, 2015b) and Sullivan-Bissett (2015) (see also Letheby 2016). A cogni-
tion is epistemically innocent if it has obvious epistemic costs but also brings signiﬁcant
epistemic beneﬁts that could not have been gained in the absence of the costly cognition.
I recognise that there can be epistemic costs when humans fail to reﬂect social inequalities
such as the underrepresentation of women in science in their automatic responses. However,
I argue that cognitions that fail to reﬂect realities in this way can also bring signiﬁcant epis-
temic beneﬁts that could not have been gained if the judgements reﬂected the social reali-
ties. Furthermore, the epistemic beneﬁts of a cognition that fails to reﬂect social realities,
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and the fact that these beneﬁts cannot be obtained with a cognition that properly reﬂects
social realities, means that the cognition is often the lesser of two epistemic evils. Conse-
quently it is often the case that the best choice from an epistemic perspective is the same as
the ethical choice: to fail to reﬂect social inequalities in one’s cognition.
In order to establish the epistemic beneﬁts that can follow from failing to reﬂect social
realities in one’s judgments, I show that there are substantial epistemic costs to the alterna-
tive: engaging in what social psychologists describe as stereotyping. In the psychological
literature, the standard viewpoint is that stereotypes are associations between characteristics,
attributes, and behaviours and certain social groups (see, e.g. Hilton and von Hippel 1996,
240; Beeghly 2015). According to this deﬁnition, when we stereotype we associate certain
characteristics, attributes and behaviours more strongly with the social group about which
we stereotype than other groups. There is an alternative, normatively loaded deﬁnition
according to which stereotypes are inaccurate (see, e.g. Blum 2004), but this is not the
deﬁnition that is utilised within psychology. This means that when psychologists discuss
the impacts of stereotyping they are referring to the consequences of associating
members of some social groups more strongly than others with certain traits, including
cases in which the association reﬂects some aspect of social reality. The cognitions that
the psychological literature on stereotyping describes therefore include those that are of
interest in the current discussion, that is, cognitions that associate group members with
traits that members of their group are statistically more likely than members of other
groups to possess. For ease of discussion I adopt the descriptive rather than the normative
deﬁnition of stereotypes advocated within social psychology, so henceforth the term stereo-
type will be used to capture all associations of members of certain groups more strongly
than others with characteristics, attributes or behaviours. As my interest is social stereo-
types, I use the term to refer to associations with members of social groups.
It should be noted that my claim is not that on all occasions when we fail to reﬂect social
inequalities in our judgements the resulting cognitions are the best from an epistemic perspec-
tive. Nor is my claim that whenwe associate social groups with certain traits or characteristics
we always or even often reﬂect social realities in doing so. There is good reason to think that
many associations of this type inaccurately represent social realities (Puddifoot forthcoming).
I argue for two claims that are more modest than this. First, that our cognitions can be epis-
temically innocent when we automatically respond in an egalitarian way, treating individuals
from different social groups (e.g. women/men) as though they are equally likely to possess a
trait (e.g. being a scientist, being nurturing), even under those conditions in which members
of the relevant social group are statistically more likely to possess the trait. Second, that ega-
litarian cognitions of this sort are often epistemically innocent in this way.2
Although these claims are circumscribed, they are important for a number of reasons.
First of all, they show that we should not overstate the case for the epistemic/ethical
dilemma. In spite of appearances, in many situations we should not raise objections to
the ethical option on the basis that it has epistemic costs, or vice versa, because the same
option is likely to be the best from both the epistemic and ethical perspective. Second of
all, and relatedly, the epistemic innocence claim provides a way to respond to one
natural defence of automatic stereotyping. When people are criticised for stereotyping on
the basis that they are being unethical, they might respond that they are just following
the facts, responding in the way that those who want knowledge or understanding
should respond, because the stereotypes that they are applying reﬂect social reality. The
argument in this paper shows that it is possible to respond to this claim in more than one
way. If one has the required evidence to hand, one can show that the stereotype does not
truly reﬂect reality. But even if one does not have this evidence, based on the arguments
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in this paper one can present reasons for thinking that, as a result of stereotyping, the agent
is ultimately less likely to follow the facts because of the downstream epistemic costs of
stereotyping which often follow regardless of the way that the stereotype reﬂects reality.
Third, the claims in this paper provide implications for how we should think about
strategies to mitigate the effects of implicit bias. Implicit biases are “fast, automatic,
and difﬁcult to control processes that encode stereotypes and evaluative content, and
inﬂuence how we think and behave” (Holroyd and Puddifoot, forthcoming). Implicit
biases lead to the association of members of certain social groups with concepts or affec-
tive responses, operate unintentionally and can occur outside the agent’s awareness.3 If
people automatically respond in the way that reﬂects social realities, they will be inﬂu-
enced by implicit biases that lead some social groups to be associated more strongly
than others with certain, often desirable characteristics. Various strategies have been
advocated to reduce the inﬂuence of implicit bias on thought and action, and, as propo-
nents of the ethical/epistemic dilemma have pointed out, many of the strategies have the
potential to prevent information about social realities from inﬂuencing our judgements.
Some strategies that have been advocated involve preventing associations from being
triggered. For example, the strategy outlined in the second opening example of ensuring
that curriculum vitae are anonymous at the point that they are evaluated has been advo-
cated as a way to reduce the impact of implicit bias (Steinpreis, Anders, and Ritze 1999;
Saul 2013). If this strategy is implemented, information identifying the social group
membership of a candidate, such as their gender, age, religion, ethnicity or details
about any disabilities they have, is removed. When people make judgements of anon-
ymous curriculum vitae their judgements are unlikely to be inﬂuenced by automatic
associations with a social group because the evaluators will not know which social
group the candidates belong to. In another example, the use of implementation intentions
or “if-then” plans has been encouraged (e.g. Stewart and Payne 2008; Saul 2013; Madva
2016a). When someone forms an implementation intention they form a speciﬁc action
plan such as if I meet a woman in science, I will think scientiﬁc expert. The plans are
speciﬁed so that they lead to the triggering of speciﬁc concepts or affective responses
(e.g. the concept expert and/or a positive affective response) in the presence of speciﬁc
cues (e.g. a woman in science). Where a person would make an association that better
reﬂected the social reality in the absence of the implementation intention, for example,
an association between scientiﬁc expertise and men, the implementation intention will
prevent associations that reﬂect something of social reality from being triggered and
inﬂuencing a judgement. A third strategy to mitigate implicit bias involves changing
the associations that people make with members of certain social groups. People are
encouraged to consider counter-stereotypical individuals, that is, individuals who do
not ﬁt the stereotype of a social group, to change the way that they respond to
members of the group (Blair, Ma, and Lenton 2001). The strategy of considering
counter-stereotypical examples can be viewed as leading people to less accurately
reﬂect social reality in their judgements where the initial association reﬂected some
aspect of social reality. It might therefore be thought that each of these strategies used
to counter implicit bias is problematic from an epistemic perspective whenever our
initial automatic responses would reﬂect social reality because they lead people to
make judgements that fail to reﬂect the social realities: either by controlling the triggering
of the associations or changing the associations that are made. A ﬁnal implication of the
argument in this paper is that even where the strategies have the consequence of leading
people to fail to reﬂect social reality they can nonetheless be viewed positively from an
epistemic perspective.4
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2. Epistemic innocence
The notion of epistemic innocence is central to the current discussion, so this section out-
lines in more detail what it is for cognition to be epistemically innocent. Bortolotti (2015a)
introduces the notion of epistemic innocence through a comparison with the justiﬁcation-
defence in UK and US law. A justiﬁcation-defence is used to establish the innocence of
an individual by showing that their act did not constitute an offence under the circumstances
in which it was performed. Justiﬁcation-defences can apply where an action prevents
serious harm. They apply where an action that would be viewed as a criminal offense
under other circumstances is viewed as an emergency response. Bortolotti’s claim is that
a similar defence can be made of some epistemically costly cognitions. While they bring
epistemic costs, they lead to the avoidance of other epistemic costs that could not otherwise
have been avoided. Two conditions are met by any epistemically innocent cognition:
(A) Epistemic beneﬁt: the cognition confers some signiﬁcant epistemic beneﬁt to an
epistemic agent at a given time.
(B) No Alternatives: alternative cognitions that would confer the same epistemic
beneﬁt without the epistemic costs are not available to the agent at that time.
My claim is that cognitions that fail to reﬂect social inequalities are often epistemically
innocent. While they bring epistemic costs, they lead to the avoidance of other signiﬁcant epis-
temic costs. By leading to the avoidance of these costs, the cognitions confer signiﬁcant epis-
temic beneﬁts to the agent at the given time that could not have been obtained if the agent had
a cognition that was non-faulty in the sense that it reﬂected the relevant social inequalities.
A subset of epistemically innocent cognitions are the lesser of two epistemic evils; while
they are faulty because they bring epistemic costs, they lead to the avoidance of more sub-
stantial epistemic costs associated with cognitions that lack their faults (Bortolotti 2015a).
In addition to showing that cognitions that fail to reﬂect social inequalities can be epistemi-
cally innocent, I aim to show that the same cognitions often belong to the subset of episte-
mically innocent cognitions that are the lesser of two epistemic evils.
I ﬁrst show that there can be epistemic beneﬁts to making automatic associations
between certain social groups and their members and certain traits, and therefore epistemic
costs to failing to make these associations (section 3). Then I show that these costs can be
outweighed by the beneﬁts of failing to make the associations, so that cognitions that fail to
reﬂect social inequalities can be epistemically innocent. To achieve the latter goal, I show
the following things:
(1) There are epistemic costs of reﬂecting social inequalities in our judgements
(section 4).
(2) These costs can be avoided by failing to reﬂect social inequalities in our judge-
ments (section 5).
(3) There are often no alternative ways (other than failing to reﬂect social inequalities)
to gain the epistemic beneﬁts of failing to reﬂect social inequalities in our judge-
ments (section 6).
(4) The costs of failing to reﬂect social inequalities in our judgements are often out-
weighed by the beneﬁts (section 7).
An important question is raised by any discussion of epistemic costs and beneﬁts: what
exactly makes something a cost or a beneﬁt? In previous discussions of epistemic costs and
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beneﬁts, a consequentialist approach has been taken (Bortolotti 2015a; arguably also Gendler
2011) and a cognition is viewed as epistemically good if it leads to positive consequences
from an epistemic perspective while something is viewed as epistemically bad if it leads to
negative consequences. I too focus on consequences, arguing that there are positive conse-
quences that follow from failing to reﬂect some social realities in our judgements: an agent
becomes disposed to respond in ways that increase the chance that they will obtain true
beliefs and become disposed to form beliefs that are more consistent with and better supported
by the evidence available to them. It is worth noting, however, that the claim that a cognition
is epistemically innocent is not equivalent to the claim that the believer is justiﬁed in believing
the products of the cognition. It is consistent with the discussion in this paper, for example,
that to be justiﬁed in making the choice not to reﬂect certain social realities in one’s judge-
ments, and in believing the product of the judgement, one might need to be aware of the epis-
temic innocence of cognitions that fail to reﬂect the realities.
3. Epistemic beneﬁts to accurately reﬂecting reality
The aim of this paper is thus to establish that the epistemic beneﬁts of failing to reﬂect social
realities in our automatic judgements often outweigh the epistemic costs. My focus is there-
fore predominantly on the epistemic beneﬁts of failing to reﬂect social inequalities in our
automatic responses, but as I argue that failing to reﬂect social realities can be the lesser of
two epistemic evils, it is worth brieﬂy providing a case in support of the idea that it is epis-
temically costly. As a consequentialist approach is being taken to epistemic costs and beneﬁts,
to establish that there are epistemic costs, it will sufﬁce to show that we are disposed, as a
consequence of failing to reﬂect social realities, to respond poorly from an epistemic perspec-
tive under some conditions. What follows, then, is an example that shows one way that we
can be disposed to respond in ways that will reduce the chance that we will make accurate
judgements as a result of failing to reﬂect social realities in our judgements.
Imagine that you are asked whether a randomly selected female is more likely to be a
scientist or a non-scientist. You harbour an implicit bias associating science with men, so
you respond that the female is more likely to be a non-scientist. You have access to no
other information about the individual that can guide your judgement. In such a situation,
there will be epistemic beneﬁts to being inﬂuenced by the implicit bias: as a result of doing
so you will be more likely to make an accurate judgement than if you did not make the associ-
ation and you will be no less likely to respond appropriately to evidence about the speciﬁc
individual because there is no such evidence available. As the association tracks something
of social reality (say you are in the UK where only 13% people working in the sciences in
2014 were women (WISE 2015)), it will dispose you to respond in certain ways that could,
under conditions of this sort, increase your chance of making a correct judgement. Given
that there can be cases like these, where there are epistemic beneﬁts to automatically associ-
ating members of some social groups more strongly than others with certain traits, there can be
corresponding epistemic costs to responding in an egalitarian way, and not making an associ-
ation of this sort (or not allowing the association to be activated). The dispositions to respond
in ways that could increase one’s chance of obtaining true beliefs or responding appropriately
to the evidence, which come with making the association, will be absent or not manifest.
4. Epistemic costs of implicit stereotyping
Now let us turn to the epistemic costs of automatically associating members of some social
groups more strongly than others with certain traits. Why should we think that making
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associations that reﬂect social realities is epistemically costly? To provide an answer to this
question, this section describes downstream epistemic costs that can result from engaging in
this form of implicit stereotyping: showing how automatic stereotyping leads one to form
beliefs that are insensitive to relevant evidence and unlikely to track the truth. The purpose
of the outline is to highlight: (i) the vast quantity of downstream epistemic costs that can
follow from stereotyping, and, (ii) that epistemic costs follow from stereotyping regardless
of whether or not the stereotype reﬂects some aspect of social reality.5
Distortion of memories
The ﬁrst epistemic cost of automatic stereotyping is that it distorts our memories about indi-
viduals to whom we apply a stereotype. When a person applies a stereotype to a particular
individual they attend to and remember features of the individual that ﬁt the stereotype
better than features that do not ﬁt the stereotype (Rothbart, Evans, and Fulero 1979;
Cohen 1981; Srull, Lichtenstein, and Rothbart 1985). For example, Cohen (1981) under-
took a study in which participants were shown a clip in which a woman and a man were
having a discussion. Some participants were led to believe that the woman was a waitress
and others were led to believe that she was a librarian. Although they were shown identical
tapes, participants who believed that the woman was a librarian were more likely to remem-
ber that she was wearing glasses, and participants who believed that she was a waitress were
more likely to remember that she was drinking beer (she was both wearing glasses and
drinking beer). In other words, participants were more likely to remember the woman as
possessing features that ﬁt the stereotype associated with her job than features that do
not. In another study, aimed at studying the effects of implicit racial bias on memory, par-
ticipants were presented with a description of an ambiguous confrontation in a bar (Levin-
son 2007). The race of a key protagonist was manipulated: the same description was
presented to different participants but in some descriptions the key protagonist was a Cau-
casian person, William, while in others it was Tyronne, an African American or Kawika, a
Hawaiian man. Participants were asked to state whether certain descriptions of features of
the scenario were true or false. The study revealed biased memory effects: people recalled
the protagonist as having engaged in signiﬁcantly more aggressive actions when he was
named Tyronne than when his name was William or Kawika, regardless of whether or
not the actions had really occurred. They were more likely to (truly or falsely) recall an
aggressive act if the protagonist was given an African American name rather than a Cau-
casian or Hawaiian name. Meanwhile, participants were more likely to falsely recall miti-
gating factors when the person described in the scenario was called Kawika. The memory
effects did not correlate with measures of explicit bias, suggesting that implicit biases were
responsible for the memory biases. The full extent of the epistemic costliness of memory
biases like these is outlined in this section.
What we remember often determines what we believe and the types of information that
we draw upon when we make judgements (see, e.g. Rothbart 1981). This means that stereo-
types can lead us to form distorted beliefs and make distorted judgements: ones that fail to
reﬂect the true nature of individuals. If one interacts with a black male, and applies the black
male stereotype, he might display many characteristics – he might be articulate, knowl-
edgeable and generous – but if he shows any signs of being aggressive then one is
likely to remember this better than the other features displayed because aggression is a
part of the stereotype of black males (Devine and Elliott 1995). One will then believe
and judge the man to be aggressive rather than as possessing positive characteristics. If
one interacts with a woman one knows to be a successful career women, so when one
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thinks of her the career women stereotype is automatically activated, she might be smart and
funny, but if she shows any signs of being cold rather than warm, the coldness will be
remembered better than the other features because it ﬁts with the stereotype of career
women as competent but cold (Fiske et al. 1999). Rather than reﬂecting the multifaceted
nature of these individuals in one’s beliefs one will believe them to possess the stereotypical
features that they appear to possess but not the other features. This will be epistemically
costly because it will lead to a distorted impression of individuals that fails to accurately
reﬂect the available evidence about them.
Notably, the Cohen study has been interpreted as providing reason for thinking that
having information about the social category membership of an individual, in this case
information about a person’s job, can increase the amount of information that is remem-
bered about that individual (Jussim 2012).6 Participants in the experiment who were
given information about the woman’s job before they were shown the tape remembered
on average remembered 7% more of the target’s traits than participants who were given
the same information after watching the tape. It might seem as if having the social category
information, and therefore having the stereotype activated, is better from an epistemic per-
spective than not doing so because it allows more information about the speciﬁc case to be
gathered. However, although more information is remembered as a result of the possession
of the social category information, the information that is remembered is biased so that she
is represented as more stereotypical than she really is. Given the choice to have more but
biased information, or less but unbiased information, the best choice from an epistemic per-
spective will often be the unbiased sample.
To see this, consider the following example. A panel is hiring a researcher to work in a
neuroscience lab. The panel members sift through the application forms of the candidates
before creating a shortlist. Based on the empirical ﬁndings just discussed, if the panel
members have social category information about the candidates (e.g. their gender, ethnicity,
religion), they will remember more of the characteristics of the candidates but they will
remember the characteristics in a biased way. So, for example, if a female candidate has
taken a career break for maternity and spent a semester at a prestigious foreign institution
as a visiting research fellow, the former is likely to be attended to and remembered but not
the latter because the maternity break ﬁts the stereotype associating women with the dom-
estic sphere more strongly than careers. The maternity break is likely to be taken to provide
evidence of the candidate’s lack of commitment to her career and this impression will not be
counterbalanced by the information about her prestigious research visit. The result will be a
distorted picture of the female’s commitment to her career. In a case of this sort individuals
would be highly likely to form a more accurate evaluation if they remembered less infor-
mation, for example, only the candidates’ qualiﬁcations, but the information was balanced
and not biased to ﬁt stereotypes.
This case illustrates how automatic stereotyping can produce a distorted picture of
reality even where a stereotype reﬂects social reality in some respect. While it is true
that women are vastly underrepresented in the sciences, and therefore any randomly
selected committed scientist is likely to be a man, a stereotype that associates women
but not men with being committed to a scientiﬁc career can still lead to a distorted
picture of females to whom the stereotype is applied.
Misinterpretation of ambiguous evidence
The second epistemic cost of stereotyping is that it leads to the misinterpretation of ambigu-
ous actions. When a piece of behaviour could be interpreted as properly belonging to various
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different categories (e.g. aggressive or playful), the activation of a stereotype sets expectan-
cies, leading the ambiguous action to be interpreted in a way that is consistent with the stereo-
type (Duncan 1976; Sagar and Schoﬁeld 1980). For example, in a study undertaken by
Duncan (1976) participants were shown a clip of one person shoving another. When the pro-
tagonist was black and the victim was white the majority of participants (75%) judged the
shove to be an act of violence. When the protagonist was white and the victim was black
only a small minority of participants (17%) judged the shove to be an act of violence. The
best explanation of the participant’s interpretations of the shoving incident is that their judge-
ments were determined by the stereotype associating black people and not white people with
violence. The same action was interpreted differently depending on the stereotype that was
applied. Devine (1989) found a similar effect following from implicit stereotyping. She
found that individuals unconsciously primed with words associated with the stereotype of
black people viewed ambiguous behaviour to be more aggressive than those who were not
primed in this way. When the automatically activated stereotype associating black people
with violence was applied, an inaccurate judgement was made: ambiguous evidence was
interpreted in a way that led people to think that the act was violent rather than ambiguous
(for further evidence of the inﬂuence of implicit associations on the interpretation of ambig-
uous behaviour see Gawronski, Geschke, and Banse 2003). It is epistemically costly that our
stereotypes work in this way because they lead to misperceptions of behavioural evidence.
It is clear that stereotypes can have this epistemic cost while reﬂecting something of a
social reality. Imagine, for example, that a woman displays errors in her speech when
explaining a scientiﬁc concept at a conference. The speech errors are ambiguous; they
are consistent with her lacking knowledge about the topic about which she is speaking,
but also with her lacking conﬁdence speaking in a public arena. Because she is a
woman, and science and scientiﬁc expertise are associated with men, a person applying
the scientist stereotype is likely to interpret her ambiguous behaviour as indicative of a
lack of knowledge rather than a lack of conﬁdence. On the other hand, a man displaying
the same speech errors is likely to be interpreted as knowledgeable but lacking conﬁdence
because science, and scientiﬁc expertise, is associated with men rather than women. Once
again, as women are underrepresented in science, most scientiﬁc experts are men, so the
stereotype reﬂects something of social reality. Nonetheless, it can lead to inappropriate
interpretations of individuals’ behaviours. While the behaviours should be interpreted as
ambiguous, they are interpreted in ways ﬁtting with a stereotype.
Failure to notice differences between individuals
A third epistemic cost of automatic stereotyping follows from the way that stereotyping
leads individuals to be viewed as a part of a majority or minority group. When people
are categorised together due to their traits (e.g. skin colour, gender, ﬁnancial situation)
because a stereotype is activated they become viewed as group members. The group
may be a minority or a majority group. Members of minority groups are seen as less
diverse, more likely to share characteristics (Bartsch and Judd 1993). For example, male
nurses, who are a minority group, are viewed as more similar to each other than female
nurses (Hewstone, Crisp, and Rhiannon 2011). Members of minority groups are assumed
to share characteristics with other members of their group who have been previously
encountered. Differences between members of minority groups are less readily noticed
than differences between members of majority groups. This is epistemically costly
because it means that details about individuals, which are likely to be relevant to judge-
ments that are made about those individuals, go unnoticed.
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From the example of male nurses it is possible to see how even a stereotype that accu-
rately reﬂects some aspect of social reality can have the results just described. If nursing is
stereotyped as female, this reﬂects the social reality that the majority of nurses are female. A
consequence of this will be that the status of males as members of a minority group is made
salient. If they are viewed as members of a minority group then they will be viewed as hom-
ogenous. People who assess them will be less sensitive to their individual traits, skills and
experiences as they will be assumed to resemble previously encountered male nurses.
Applying the same principle to the case of women in the sciences, the distinctive charac-
teristics of female scientists are less likely to be noticed than those of their male counter-
parts, because others will assume that they are similar to previously encountered
members of their minority group.
Failure to notice similarities between members of different groups
A related phenomenon is that where individuals are viewed as forming distinct groups due
to the characteristics that they possess, in other words, as a result of the activation of a
stereotype, differences between the groups are magniﬁed (e.g. Tajfel 1981). A stereotype
associating one set of individuals with a characteristic can highlight differences between
that set of individuals and others, preventing similarities between members of the different
groups from being noticed. Epistemic errors can follow because inaccurate assessments are
made of the traits possessed by group members; they are inaccurately assessed as less
similar to each other than they really are.
To see how this phenomenon can occur even where a stereotype accurately reﬂects
some aspect of social reality, we can return to the science case. The stereotype associating
science with men can lead to male and female scientists being treated as distinct groups.
Application of the stereotype can highlight differences between male and female scientists.
This can lead people to magnify the differences and fail to see the similarities between male
and female counterparts. Where one gender is associated with certain traits, like being com-
mitted or uncommitted to their careers, and the differences between males and females are
magniﬁed, evidence of those traits are less likely to be noticed when they are present in the
other gender.
Failure to track truth in explanations of behaviour
A further epistemic cost to stereotyping is that people who engage in the practice fail to
develop explanations of other people’s behaviour that are well-grounded in evidence or
likely to track the truth about the behaviour’s cause or motivation. People who rely on
stereotypes tend to explain actions in terms of the dispositions of the actor if the actions
ﬁt the stereotype of the actor’s social group, but they explain the actions in terms of the situ-
ation of the actor rather than the disposition if the actions fail to ﬁt the stereotype. For
example, if a black person shoves a white person, their action is attributed to their disposi-
tions, but if a white person shoves a white person, the action is explained in terms of fea-
tures of the situation (Duncan 1976). The same action, produced by the same cause in an
extremely similar situation, is explained in different ways depending on the social group
membership of the individual being assessed. In addition to this, stereotypes are often
taken to provide sufﬁcient explanations of individuals’ behaviours so further explanations
are not sought where they should be (Sanbonmatsu, Akimoto, and Gibson 1994). In the
science case, speech errors displayed by a female while explaining a scientiﬁc concept
might be explained by lack of scientiﬁc expertise if the stereotype associating scientiﬁc
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expertise with men is activated, where another explanation would be far more adequate.
Even where there could be some sense in which the stereotype could be said to reﬂect
social realities, the error of taking someone’s social group membership to provide an expla-
nation of their behaviour rather than seeking further relevant information could occur and
be epistemically costly, leading to a lack of true understanding.
Inappropriate associations and cognitive depletion
It might be thought that when people engage in automatic stereotyping that reﬂects the
social reality at least they make appropriate associations: If people automatically associate
science with men or women with nurturing then the association could be appropriate
because of reﬂecting social reality. However, currently popular models of stereotypes
and stereotyping provide good reason to think that when people make associations of
this type they consequently either make other associations that fail to reﬂect the social
reality (Kelly and Roedder 2008) or fail to make other associations that would reﬂect
social reality.
On the associative network view, stereotypes are a set of linked attributes (Manis,
Nelson, and Shedler 1988; Carlston 1992). The stereotype of a scientist is a set of attributes
– for example, lab-coat wearing, bespectacled, male, hardworking, conscientious, expert,
attentive to detail, innovative thinker – which are linked together in the mind of the
believer. The perception of one of the attributes leads to the activation of associated con-
cepts. Not only are concepts activated, however, feelings of positivity or negativity can
also be activated. On this model, stereotyping involves a number of different associations,
which are like a tightly knit cluster of beliefs. When one holds a cluster of beliefs, one belief
might be true but it might trigger a number of false beliefs. The same is true of associations.
One association might reﬂect social reality in some respect but trigger other associations
that do not reﬂect social reality. For example, the association between science and men
might trigger a further association between men and attentiveness to detail and high IQs.
Individual men might therefore be associated with these positive characteristics even
where the positive associations are inappropriate. Men might be associated with attentive-
ness to detail or a high IQ when they are no more likely to have these traits than women.
Meanwhile, the associations might not be made between women and these positive charac-
teristics because the stereotype does not associate them with science.
The prototype model of stereotypes also suggests that inappropriate associations will be
made and appropriate associations left unmade. On the prototype model, stereotypes are
abstract representations of typical features of members of a group (Cantor and Mischel
1979), for example, the stereotype of a bird might be an abstract representation of a
small-winged creature, creature with beak, ﬂying-creature, creature that tweets. Whether
a stereotype is applied to any individual depends on the similarity between traits of the indi-
vidual and a set of typical features ordinary associated with members of the group. But the
traits of the individual that determine whether the stereotype is applied are usually super-
ﬁcial features of the individual, such as signs from their face of their gender or race (see,
e.g. Ashmore and Del Boca 1979; Bodenhausen and Macrae 1998). These features of
human psychology combine to mean that the associations are likely to often be applied
inappropriately. A case in which an association would be made when it shouldn’t be is
the following: a woman displays superﬁcial features that are a part of the abstract represen-
tation of a wife and mother, that is, feminine facial and bodily features. Other features of the
abstract representation of a wife and mother are triggered. However, the woman has few
other characteristics associated with being a wife and mother: most notably, she has no
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husband or children. The same case could be one in which associations are not made but the
should be. The woman displays superﬁcial features that are not associated with science, that
is, the same feminine facial and bodily features. Other features that are a part of the abstract
representation of scientists are therefore not associated with her. The perception of the
superﬁcial signs that she is a woman inhibits the scientist stereotype. However, the individ-
ual possesses many other features associated with the scientist stereotype: she has expertise
in science and related positive traits like attentiveness to detail or innovative thinking.
Things seem little better on the exemplar view of stereotypes (see, e.g. Smith and Za´rate
1992). According to this view, stereotypes represent groups through particular concrete
examples, for instance, the stereotype of a bird is represented through a robin. Whether
or not a stereotype is activated in a particular case is determined by the similarity
between the target individual and the exemplar. The fact remains that superﬁcial features
of an individual determine whether they are judged to be similar to the exemplar. This
means that a cluster of features possessed by a particular exemplar will be associated
with a target individual only if they possess superﬁcial features that are similar to those
of the exemplar. For example, Einstein might be the exemplar of a scientist. Then a
cluster of features associated with Einstein (expertise in science, genius, innovative think-
ing) will be automatically associated with an individual only if they display superﬁcial fea-
tures associated with him (being male, looking eccentric, etc.). Individuals who do not
display these superﬁcial characteristics will not be stereotyped as a scientist, and will there-
fore not have Einstein’s features automatically associated with them. This is bad news for
many women, who are much less likely than their male counterparts to possess at least one
of the superﬁcial features of exemplars of science like Einstein, that is, having masculine
facial features. It is also bad news for those of us who want to make accurate judgements
about individual women who are scientists but do not share the superﬁcial features of fam-
iliar exemplars of scientists because if the exemplar view is correct we are unlikely to auto-
matically associate these individuals with features that they actually possess (expertise in
science, attentiveness to detail, innovative thinking). In addition to this, individuals who
share superﬁcial characteristics with exemplars of scientists are likely to be automatically
associated with other characteristics possessed by those exemplars even if the only features
that they share are the superﬁcial ones (e.g. their facial features).
Finally, stereotyping claims are sometimes argued to be generic claims, with a similar
structure to claims like “ducks lay eggs” or “mosquitoes carry the West Nile virus” (see, e.g.
Leslie 2007). They are not universal claims, but they suggest that members of a group typi-
cally, characteristically or strikingly possess certain features. Sally Haslanger (2010) pre-
sents reason for thinking that if stereotypical thought has the structure of generic claims,
it can lead to inappropriate associations, even in a context in which the stereotypes
applied reﬂect something of social reality. Haslanger points out that generic claims that
involve associations between members of certain social groups and particular character-
istics can imply that there is something essential about the nature of the group members
in virtue of which they possess the characteristics associated with them. These essentializ-
ing judgements can be inaccurate because it is really the social context in which the group
members are located that means that they are more likely than others to possess the traits
associated with them. For example, women might not only be associated with being nurtur-
ing but also with having a nature in virtue of which they are disposed to be nurturing. While
the association between women and nurturing might reﬂect something of reality, as a result
of social constructs that lead women to occupy a nurturing role, it can lead to a further
association that fails to reﬂect reality: the association of women with an essentially nurtur-
ing nature.
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A number of negative epistemic consequences can follow from making inappropriate
associations or failing to make appropriate associations. We can make poor inferences,
assuming that people have characteristics that they lack, or that they do not have character-
istics that they do have (Egan 2011). For example, we can assume that women are lacking in
scientiﬁc expertise but nurturing, because of the superﬁcial characteristics they display.
Alternatively, we can notice that we are making erroneous judgements and expend a
large amount of cognitive energy to suppress our stereotyping responses (Egan 2011;
Gendler 2011). This can lead to the depletion of our cognitive resources, which can in
turn cause errors of judgement. The latter phenomenon has been illustrated through exper-
iments in which white participants are required to interact with black experimenters before
completing a cognitive task (Richeson and Shelton 2007; cited in Gendler 2011). Those
who were found to produce high scores on implicit measures of racial stereotyping, indicat-
ing that they make strong negative implicit associations with black people, performed
poorly on the cognitive tasks, seemingly because their cognitive resources were depleted
by efforts to suppress their stereotyping.7
5. Epistemic beneﬁts of failing to reﬂect social realities
Now let us consider how the epistemic costs outlined in section 4 can be avoided by our
cognitions failing to reﬂect social realities and us thereby making more egalitarian auto-
matic responses. I focus on two of the strategies that were outlined in the introduction:
making curriculum vitae anonymous in recruitment processes and considering counter-
stereotypical examples. Both strategies involve reducing the chance of social realities
being reﬂected in judgements by preventing stereotypes from being automatically triggered.
The ﬁrst strategy involves an individual being placed in a position in which they cannot
reﬂect certain social realities in their judgements. If one does not have access to information
about the social category to which an individual belongs then one cannot make automatic
associations with an individual due to their group membership. The second strategy
involves choosing for social realities to be misrepresented. It involves putting in place a
situation in which people respond as if the social reality is different to how it is. It leads
to an egalitarian response; people responding as if men and women are represented
equally within the sciences, or rates of involvement in crime are equal across different
races. As stereotyping involves associating particular social groups more than others
with traits the egalitarian response will not involve stereotyping. Both strategies therefore
avoid the epistemic costs outlined in section 4 by avoiding instances of automatic
stereotyping.
How, more speciﬁcally, are each of the costs avoided? First, if either of the strategies is
adopted then information about individuals that ﬁts the stereotype of their social group is no
more likely to be remembered than information that does not, because a stereotype will not
be triggered. Second, for the same reason, ambiguous evidence about individuals, for
example, actions that could potentially be viewed as signs of ignorance or lack of conﬁ-
dence, will not be misinterpreted in a way that is ﬁtting with the stereotype of their
social group. Third, individuals are less likely to be assumed to share traits with previously
encountered members of their social group if their group is a minority group (e.g. women in
science, an ethnic minority group). If the ﬁrst strategy is adopted then the individual’s status
as a member of a minority social group will not inﬂuence the judgements made about them
because it will not be known. If the second strategy is adopted then sets of individuals will
be less likely to be divided into separate groups on the basis that they are viewed as posses-
sing different traits because they will be viewed as equally likely to possess certain traits, so
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they will not be separated into minority and majority groups. Minority groups will not be
assumed to share the same characteristics, because they will not be viewed as separate from
majority groups, so people will not fail to notice differences between individuals. Fourth,
and relatedly, differences between an individual being assessed and members of other
social groups will not be magniﬁed: either because their social group membership is not
known or because they will not be treated as a member of a distinct social group. Fifth,
as stereotypes will not be triggered if either strategy is adopted, behaviours that are
ﬁtting with the stereotype will not be explained in terms of the dispositions of the individual
while behaviours that are counter-stereotypical will not be explained in terms of the indi-
vidual’s situation. Explanations of individuals and their behaviours will not focus on stereo-
types where they should focus on other characteristics. Sixth, and ﬁnally, as a stereotype is
not triggered if either strategy is adopted it is less likely that the believer will make associ-
ations that are inaccurate and not endorsed. Poor inferences and the cognitive depletion that
can accompany the suppression of disavowed stereotyping are therefore unlikely to follow.
This discussion provides good reason for thinking that cognitions that fail to reﬂect
social realities can meet the epistemic beneﬁt condition. Although they bring the epistemic
cost of preventing the agent from being disposed to respond in some ways that will, under
some circumstances, increase her chances of obtaining true beliefs or responding appropri-
ately to the evidence, they bring substantial epistemic beneﬁts by leading to the avoidance
of the signiﬁcant costs that are associated with stereotyping even when the stereotypes
applied reﬂect some aspect of social reality.
6. No alternatives
The same cognitions can also meet the no alternatives condition because alternative cogni-
tions that would confer the same epistemic beneﬁts without the epistemic costs are not
available to the agent at the time. Given that the cognitions that are the focus of the
current discussion are automatic associations that bring epistemic costs because they fail
to reﬂect social realities, the relevant alternative cognitions are automatic cognitions that
reﬂect the social realities (e.g. cognitions that associate science with men or women with
being nurturing). For the cognition that fails to reﬂect social reality to be epistemically inno-
cent, it must be the case that the believer could not have an automatic cognition that reﬂects
the social reality while also gaining the epistemic beneﬁts that follow from failure to do so.
There is good reason to think that this is often the case. The psychological literature dis-
cussed in the previous section suggests that where people are sensitive to differences
between members of different social groups, thereby having a cognition that is non-
faulty in the sense that it reﬂects social realities, they are highly likely to engage in auto-
matic stereotyping (see also Gendler 2011) that leads to the sorts of errors outlined in
section 4. There are consequently often two forms of cognition available to the believer
in the face of a social inequity: (i) a cognition that fails to reﬂect the social realities and
avoids the epistemic costs associated with stereotyping, or (ii) a cognition that reﬂects
the social realities but fails to avoid the epistemic costs associated with stereotyping.
There is no alternative cognition available to the thinker that reﬂects the social realities
but provides the beneﬁts associated with avoiding the costs outlined in (4a–f).
7. The lesser of two epistemic evils
Finally, there is good reason for thinking that automatic cognitions that fail to reﬂect social
realities can belong to the subset of epistemically innocent cognitions that are the lesser of
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two epistemic evils. There is a weaker and a stronger claim that can be made in this
vicinity.8
Weaker lesser evil claim: there are some conditions under which cognitions that fail to
reﬂect social realities are the lesser of two epistemic evils.
Stronger lesser evil claim: there are many conditions under which cognitions that fail to
reﬂect social realities are the lesser of two epistemic evils.
Substantiation of the weaker claim is all that is required to put pressure on the inference
from evidence that a stereotype reﬂects some aspect of social reality to the conclusion that it
is best from an epistemic perspective to make the association encoded in the stereotype. If
there are some conditions where the best epistemic consequences follow if one does not
reﬂect social realities, evidence that a stereotype reﬂects some aspect of social reality
does not establish that it is best from an epistemic perspective to apply it.
The following example illustrates the correctness of the weaker claim. Imagine a person
making an assessment of the contribution that a female scientist could make to their
research team. If they automatically respond by applying the stereotype associating
science with men (the way that reﬂects the social reality that women are underrepresented
in the sciences), then the disposition that they manifest will be one that would increase the
chance of them making an accurate assessment of the probability that a randomly selected
individual scientist is a woman or a man, or a randomly selected individual person is a
scientist, in the absence of informative case-speciﬁc information. However, if they
respond in a way that does not involve stereotyping (the egalitarian response that fails to
reﬂect the social reality), then they will respond in a way that brings the advantages associ-
ated with avoiding the following numerous pitfalls: (i) memory distortions that would make
them remember features of the candidate that ﬁt the stereotype that scientiﬁc experts are
men better than other features; (ii) viewing ambiguous behaviours of the candidate as evi-
dence of lack of expertise; (iii) failing to notice differences between the candidate and other,
previously encountered female scientists; (iv) failing to notice similarities between the can-
didate and male scientists who have positive features that suggest that they are experts; (v)
the tendency to assume that any behaviours that are stereotypical of non-experts (e.g. lack
of conﬁdence speaking about the subject) are indicative of the dispositions of the candidate
rather than the situation that she is placed in; and, ﬁnally, (vi) the tendency to make all sorts
of associations with the candidate that are inaccurate and not endorsed, leading cognitive
efforts to be expended on suppressing the stereotyping rather than, for example, concentrat-
ing on the evidence relating to the levels of expertise of the candidate. The beneﬁts associ-
ated with avoiding these pitfalls in this context vastly outweigh the beneﬁts that come from
automatically responding in a way that reﬂects the statistical reality that women are under-
represented in the sciences.
It might be tempting to draw the universal conclusion here that the epistemic beneﬁts of
failing to reﬂect social realities by not engaging in automatic stereotyping always outweigh
the epistemic costs. This would be too swift. Sometimes individuating information about
the speciﬁc case is sparse and therefore, with information about social group membership
as the main guide of one’s judgements, one might be more likely to obtain true beliefs if one
makes an association that reﬂects the social reality. However, cases of this sort are few and
far between. More often, the accuracy of our judgements depends on our ability to access
and process case-speciﬁc information, for example, information about particular individuals
who might be scientists, their past experience, their qualiﬁcations, their analytic skills, etc.
What the discussion in this paper shows is that when information of this sort is available,
automatic associations reﬂecting social realities are likely to prevent us from appropriately
accessing and processing the information, leading to the types of distortion of case-speciﬁc
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information outlined in section 4. As we often have informative, case-speciﬁc information
available to us, which can be distorted via automatic stereotyping, it will often be best from
an epistemic perspective not to make automatic associations. Failing to reﬂect background
information about social inequalities, so that we respond in egalitarian ways, will conse-
quently often increase our chances of making accurate judgements. Here, then, we ﬁnd
support for the stronger lesser evil claim. Not only is it sometimes the case that cognitions
that fail to reﬂect social realities are the lesser of two epistemic evils, it is often the case.
8. Objections and replies
It might be objected that sometimes it is not possible to get a proper understanding of the
situation of an individual or set of individuals without awareness of certain facts about the
social realities that they have encountered in their everyday lives (Madva 2016a). To prop-
erly understand the difﬁculties faced by women in science, such as the lack of mentoring
opportunities, it is necessary to comprehend the social reality of female underrepresentation
in the sciences. In addition to this, it might be argued that if we are not aware of social
inequalities, we will not be able to take measures to improve our epistemic situation.9 If
we are not aware of the underrepresentation of women in the sciences, we will not
realise that we are likely to be disposed to respond in a biased and distorted way to
female scientists because they are members of a minority group. It might therefore seem
to be necessary to accurately reﬂect social realities in our judgements in order to gain the
epistemic good of understanding and in order to recognise the need to mitigate the negative
effects of bias and prejudice.
This objection does provide reason to be cautious in the adoption of some strategies that
might be used to mitigate bias and prejudice. Take, for example, strategies to change the
associations that people automatically make to ensure that they are more egalitarian. The
arguments presented in this paper provide reason for thinking that in some situations
these strategies will bring overall epistemic gains by reducing the chance of stereotyping.
However, if, to achieve the egalitarian aim, one were exposed to a distorted picture of the
situation faced by some individuals within society, then the strategy could bring substantial
epistemic costs. If, for example, one is exposed to a portrayal of science in the media in
which women and men were represented equally in the sciences, and supplied with no
other information about the problems faced by women as an underrepresented group within
science, then one would be unlikely to have an adequate understanding of the plight of indi-
vidual women scientists, including the bias and prejudice they might face. Caution should
therefore be urged with regards to strategies of this sort: although they can bring the epistemic
gains associated with failing to reﬂect social realities by responding in the egalitarian way,
unless they are adopted with care they can bring substantial epistemic costs.
However, the same objections can also be taken to illustrate a way to maximise one’s
epistemic gains while failing to reﬂect social realities in one’s automatic responses. They
suggest that the best way to achieve epistemic goals can be to achieve two things simul-
taneously: (i) having an explicit understanding of social inequalities; and (ii) avoiding
the costs of automatic stereotyping by facilitating egalitarian automatic responses.10 By
achieving both of these goals the agent could ensure that they obtain the beneﬁts of
failing to reﬂect social inequalities in their automatic responses while nonetheless achieving
understanding of the plight faced by members of some social groups and the way that the
inequalities can lead to bias and prejudice.
The achievement of both of these goals simultaneously is not without complication.
There is reason to think that mere awareness of social inequalities can be enough to
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trigger automatic associations and implicit stereotyping (Correll et al. 2002; see also
Gendler 2011; Madva 2016b for discussion). This means that, for example, the awareness
of the underrepresentation of women in the sciences required to understand the difﬁculties
faced by female scientists and the way that one might respond in a biased way which needs
to mitigated, can be enough to trigger an association between science and men, leading to
automatic stereotyping. But while the simultaneous achievement of both of these goals
might be difﬁcult, it is not impossible – there is good reason to think that strategies can
be adopted to achieve this end.
To see this point, we can return to the example of Anita, who is on a hiring panel,
recruiting a scientiﬁc researcher. Let us assume that she is aware of the social reality that
women are underrepresented in the sciences, that they might consequently have suffered
difﬁculties not encountered by male counterparts, and that she is likely to be biased in jud-
gements she makes about candidates because of associating science with men. She has an
explicit understanding of the relevant social inequality and the need to take action to miti-
gate its negative effects. Her awareness of this need to take action does not preclude her
from responding in an egalitarian way when sifting through a large pile of curriculum
vitae of job candidates because she ensures that CVs are anonymous when the sifting
process is undertaken. Her automatic responses are therefore egalitarian and she avoids
the epistemic costs of automatically associating scientiﬁc expertise with men that have
been outlined in this paper. In addition to this, she can ensure that her awareness of the
underrepresentation of women in the sciences is manifest in an understanding of the difﬁ-
culties that they might have faced: Additional time and attention might be devoted to the
application materials of female candidates, on the basis that they might have suffered difﬁ-
culties not faced by male candidates. If this process is undertaken with due care and atten-
tion it will be possible to avoid it being inﬂuenced by automatic stereotyping because this
form of stereotyping can be reduced by decreasing time pressures and enabling evaluators
to fully attend to the task at hand. For instance, Martell (1991) asked participants to evaluate
descriptions of work undertaken by male and female police ofﬁcers. The work of males was
evaluated more favourably when the evaluation was made under time pressure and with
competing demands on the evaluators’ attention. However, when time pressures were elimi-
nated and evaluators were able to attend fully to the task, the discrepant judgements were
abated and automatic stereotyping was reduced (for discussion see Saul 2012).
While the objections considered in this section provide reason to re-consider some strat-
egies that might be adopted to overcome the negative effects of automatic stereotyping, they
do not therefore show that it cannot be best from an epistemic perspective to fail to reﬂect
social inequalities in our automatic responses. They show instead that we can maximise the
epistemic beneﬁts we gain by combining an understanding of the situations faced by indi-
viduals in virtue of their social group membership, an understanding of the need to moder-
ate our responses to those individuals, and automatic responses that fail to reﬂect social
inequalities. Exemplary strategies to mitigate prejudice and bias can facilitate the achieve-
ment of each of these goals simultaneously.
Conclusion
The main message to be taken from the current discussion is that often the ethical option,
reacting in the egalitarian way that fails to reﬂect social realities such as the underrepresen-
tation of women in the sciences or the higher number of women occupying nurturing roles
in our automatic responses, is also best from an epistemic perspective. It is the epistemically
innocent option and the lesser of two epistemic evils: although it brings epistemic costs,
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these are often outweighed by the epistemic beneﬁts. Even where an automatically activated
stereotype reﬂects some aspect of social reality, the activation of the stereotype can be epis-
temically costly, and it can be best from an epistemic perspective for the stereotype not to be
activated. This argument has important implications for how to respond to a natural defence
of automatic stereotyping: that if a stereotype reﬂects some aspect of social reality, by
applying the stereotype one is following the facts in a way that will increase the chance
of one making accurate judgements. The argument presented in this paper suggests that
this defence is often wrong-headed. Often it will be best from an epistemic perspective
not to reﬂect social reality in one’s automatic responses because reﬂecting reality will
increase the chance that one will engage in automatic stereotyping, suffering serious down-
stream epistemic costs.
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Notes
1. There is an important feature of this example: egalitarian principles come into conﬂict with eva-
luatively loaded automatic responses (e.g. women are better at childrearing than men) that are
ﬁtting with reality. For further discussion of examples of this sort see Haslanger (2010, 2015).
For current purposes, evaluatively loaded automatic responses are treated similarly to less eva-
luatively loaded responses (e.g. scientists are men) because the important point raised by this
paper is that the automatic associations manifest in implicit bias bring epistemic costs, and
the vast majority of these costs will follow regardless of whether they are evaluatively
loaded. That being said, it is worth noting that it is likely that there will be additional epistemic
costs that follow exclusively from evaluatively loaded automatic responses. Thanks go to an
anonymous referee and Sophie Stammers for help developing this point.
2. The frequency with which the epistemic costs of stereotyping outweigh the epistemic beneﬁts is
obviously an empirical issue. I aim to show that there is good reason to think that the psycho-
logical ﬁndings present good reason for thinking that the empirical reality is that the costs often
outweigh the beneﬁts because there are many ways and conditions under which the costs can
manifest and few by which beneﬁts can.
3. There is some debate about whether implicit biases are beliefs (Mandelbaum 2015), belief-like
states (Schwitzgebel 2010; Levy 2015) or belong in a distinct psychological category from
beliefs (Gendler 2008a, 2008b, 2011; Madva 2016a). There is also debate over whether they
are propositional (Mandelbaum 2015) or merely associative (Gendler 2008a, 2008b). This
paper remains neutral with regards to these issues, all that matters for the current discussion
is that implicit bias involves the automatic association between social groups and their
members and certain traits and evaluative content. Whether the association comes in the
form of a belief or a psychological state with propositional structure does not matter. My
focus is on the epistemic costs and beneﬁts of these associations.
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4. See section 8 for how some of these strategies can be better than others from an epistemic per-
spective, depending on the context in which they are adopted.
5. Gendler (2011) outlines three epistemic costs that can follow from implicit bias. One of these
costs is outlined in section 4f. This is the only one of Gendler’s costs to be included in this dis-
cussion because Mugg (2013) has convincingly argued that the other two costs are not epistemic
costs for the person engaging in the stereotyping.
6. Something similar might be said about the Levinson study: people remembered more aggressive
actions that actually occurred when they harboured a negative implicit bias against Black
people. It might therefore be argued that the implicit bias is epistemically beneﬁcial because
it leads to the retention of some negative information that was not remembered by people
who were not biased.
7. Joshua Mugg (2013) has argued that there are long-term gains associated with using cognitive
resources to suppress stereotyping. He makes a comparison between the use of executive func-
tion to control stereotyping and the use of executive function by a bilingual suppressing their
non-active language. Over time the bilingual gains from suppression of the non-active language
because her executive functioning is strengthened. Mugg’s suggestion is no threat to the claims
made in the current discussion. The identiﬁcation of long-term gains does not undermine the
claim crucial to this paper, that there can be epistemic costs at a given time to taking action
to prevent stereotyping.
8. Thanks to Ema Sullivan-Bissett for encouragement to clarify this distinction.
9. Thanks to Lisa Bortolotti for encouraging me to consider this point.
10. See Madva (2016b) for discussion of a similar approach to implicit bias, according to which
people should aim to control the accessibility of information about social realities.
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